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seller market power in the differentiated processed market.  Farmers receive a decreasing dollar 
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hand, the price spread due to processors’ buyer (seller) market power decreases (increases) when 
farmers’ transportation costs shrink and when consumers’ strength for brand preference increases. 
We also examine welfare: while the surplus of farmers serving a specific processor is adversely 
affected in a more concentrated processed good market, the total surplus of farmers serving all 
processors is independent of the industry concentration. In addition, consumers are worse off 
when the processed good market is more concentrated and farmers’ transportation costs are 
larger. While stronger brand preference implies a larger “travel cost” for consumers, it may 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we study the farmers-processors relationship conceptually. We consider a 
model of vertical and horizontal competition where market power is bidirectional: processors 
have buyer as well as seller market power. Farmers supply a homogeneous raw input to the 
processors, which, in turn, process it into a horizontally differentiated product. Supply in the raw 
input market, however, is not perfectly competitive because farmers are situated in different 
localities and transportation costs to any processor are non-zero. Processors are also scattered in 
different locations and buy from the nearest farmers. This spatial configuration grants the 
processors buyer market power as each of them becomes the sole buyer for a handful of farmers. 
Finally, the processors in the processed good market compete with each other by producing a 
differentiated product intended to attract consumers who have heterogeneous preferences (i.e., 
each consumer has a different “preferred brand”). This horizontal differentiation is the source of 
seller market power in our model. 
There has been an increasing concern in several food industries, most notably in meat 
packing, about the farmers’ dollar share of the final product, which has been continuously 
decreasing. This has often been attributed to increased processor concentration and the 
consequent increase in buyer market power, although product differentiation at the processor 
level may have a similar effect. The role of product differentiation as a factor in the declining 
dollar share of farmers is apparent when we look at how food processors have become more 
interested in advertising and promotional techniques that allow greater product differentiation 
and possibly larger margins. 
Prior work has studied the effects of processors’ market power in acquiring the raw 
product at a price below competitive levels. The typical assumption is that the final processed  
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product is homogeneous and that processors are price takers. Because most food processing 
industries buy raw agricultural products and transform them into branded, differentiated 
products, we add this more realistic dimension into a model that captures several unique features 
of both raw agricultural product industries (upstream “farmers”) as well as food processing 
industries (downstream “processors”). Our model is motivated by food manufacturing industries 
(e.g. canned food, packaged beef, etc.) where inputs markets are characterized by a 
homogeneous product with high transportation costs (or perishability) and processors compete 
with each other by offering a differentiated product to final consumers. In these industries, a 
highly debated issue has been whether (and how) downstream concentration, and its consequent 
enhanced buyer market power, has diminished farmers’ profitability (measured by its share of 
the final price). A main feature of our model is that it allows us to decompose total market power 
(“the price spread”) into the portion due to seller market power and the portion due to buyer 
market power, thereby informing the above mentioned debate. 
We combine two models to capture the unique features of food producers and processors. 
The model in Rogers and Sexton (1994) is used to capture key characteristics of producers’ 
markets and a variant on Salop’s (1979) model of spatial product location is used to embed 
product differentiation at the processor’s level. Under a Bertrand-Nash assumption, our results 
suggest that farmers receive a decreasing dollar share of the final price in a more concentrated 
processed good market. On the other hand, the price spread due to processors’ buyer (seller) 
market power decreases (increases) with smaller farmers’ transportation costs and with stronger 
consumers’ brand preference. We also examine a welfare analysis: while the surplus of farmers 
serving a specific processor is adversely affected by a more concentrated processed good market, 
the total surplus of farmers serving all processors is independent of the industry concentration.  
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Moreover, consumers are worse off when the processed good market is more concentrated and 
farmers’ transportation costs are larger. Consumers’ brand preference has two effects on the 
welfare: while stronger brand preference implies more “travel costs” for consumers, it may 
encourage more firms to join the market and provide more varieties, which results in welfare 
gains. For a relatively small brand preference, consumer surplus increases in brand preference. 
This paper helps us understand the farmers-processors relationship. By using more 
realistic assumptions that incorporate product differentiation in the processed good market, we 
study two components of the price spread (due to buyer market power in the raw input market 
and seller market power in the processed good market) and the corresponding welfare 
implications of market power. The results provide more complete figures about the effect of the 
concentrated food processing industry on the structure and performance of the agricultural and 
food markets and also inform the formation of public policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly review some related 
studies in section 2. In section 3 the model describing upstream and downstream markets is 
presented. Section 4 discusses the main results including the properties of price spreads and 
welfare analysis. Section 5 provides concluding remarks, limitations, and possible extensions. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
The closest papers to our work are Sexton (1990) and Rogers and Sexton (1994). These 
two studies consider a model of a homogeneous good produced by a large number of farmers 
who produce in different locations. The farmers can sell their product to a few processors but in 
doing so incur transportation costs. Processors then sell the processed homogeneous goods in a 
perfectly competitive market. Their analysis of the processor-farmer price margin is relevant to  
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our study. They show that farmers receive a decreasing dollar share of the processors’ product 
price as transportation costs increase and as the number of processors decreases. An important 
finding is that, because farmers’ output is costly to transport, positive margins are possible even 
under Bertrand competition and homogeneous products. In addition, Chen and Lent (1992) and 
Hamilton and Sunding (1997) study the unique comparative statics of a farmers’ supply shock 
when the processors enjoy buyer market power and the farmers are price takers in the production 
of a homogeneous good. 
Turning to empirical studies, an often studied topic has been the estimation of buyer 
market power. Hyde and Perloff (1994) conduct a Monte Carlo study to test the accuracy of a 
structural model and a nonstructural method for estimating the degree of buyer market power in 
a homogeneous product market with price-taker sellers. Raper, Love and Shumway (2000), and 
Schroeter, Azzam and Zhang (2000) extend New Empirical Industrial Organization methods to 
study the amount of market power enjoyed by sellers (farmers) and buyers (manufacturers / 
processors). Both studies reach a similar conclusion: manufacturers appear to have buyer market 
power whereas farmers lack seller market power. In a study that analyzes the type of buying 
behavior by processors, Just and Chern (1980) find evidence to reject the hypothesis of perfect 
competition in favor of that of oligopsonistic dominant firm-leadership. 
Few studies analyze the simultaneous exertion of market power on both the selling and 
buying side of the market. Wann and Sexton (1992) find that pear processors enjoy market 
power in the purchase of the upstream raw product and in the sale of two downstream 
differentiated products: canned pears and fruit cocktail. Gohin and Guyomard (2000) estimate 
joint oligopoly-oligopsony market power of French retailers several food product categories.  
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They strongly reject the joint null hypothesis that French retail firms behave with no oligopoly-
oligopsony market power.   
None of the above studies explicitly model downstream product differentiation in the 
context of the welfare impact of market power in the purchase of an input. This is our 
contribution, which we present next. 
 
3.  Model 
3.1  Spatial Competition in the Upstream Market 
In Rogers and Sexton’s model, farmers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and 
a few processors are located at equally spaced intervals on the line.
1 Processors pay a mill price, 
W, which farmers receive after incurring a transportation cost, t, per unit of distance, d, to the 
farm. Hence, the further away a farmer is located from the processor, the lower the net price (W-
td) s/he receives. Several characteristics of this model make it suitable for studying procurement 
of farmers’ output by processors. First, by construction, the model reflects the higher 
concentration of the food processing industry with respect to that of the raw agricultural products 
industry. Second, even though farmers’ products are homogeneous in nature, distance and 
transportation costs will prevent a given processor from undercutting a rival and gaining all 
farmers’ output, making the model more realistic and appealing. 
We present a modified version of Rogers and Sexton’s model. Farmers’ aggregate supply 
faced by a processor can be computed as 
0 ()2 ( ) d ( 2 )
M
R WW t d d M W t M ββ =− = − ∫ ,   (1) 
                                                 
1 While Rogers and Sexton (1994) motivate their model as competition on a line interval, their analysis corresponds 
to a circular model. We also use the circular model in our analysis below.  
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where R is the quantity of the raw product, M is the length of half the interval over which the 
processor is a sole buyer of the product,  () Wt d β −  is an individual farmer’s linear supply curve, 
and β  is an coefficient. 
Moreover, processor’s technology for production of Q units of the final good is one of 
fixed-proportions; i.e.,  / QR λ =  and without loss of generality  1 λ = . This gives the processors’ 
cost function:  ( ) ( ) cR WRR F =+ , where F represents fixed costs. As a result, processor’s profit 
expressed as a function of the input quantity R is given by  ( ) p RW R RF π = ⋅− −, where p is the 
price of the processed good and W(R) is the inverse supply function of the input faced by the 
processor. For Bertrand competition, processors’ profits can be written as a function of the input 
price W:  () () p RW W RW F π =⋅ − −. 
3.2  Product Differentiation in the Downstream Market 
To address imperfect competition via differentiated products in the downstream market, 
we consider a variant of Salop’s (1979) circular model of product location. There are two reasons 
for choosing this model over other alternatives. The linear city model by Hotelling forces more 
competition only one side of the product space as a product moves to the extremes, which may 
not be a realistic assumption. This feature makes the Hotelling model less mathematically 
tractable. On the other hand, a representative consumer model does not allow for several key 
consumer heterogeneity issues that we deal with below. 
Each consumer has a preferred brand location on a circle of circumference size equal to 
1. Consumers’ preferred brands are uniformly distributed on the circle and firms locate their 
brands at equally spaced intervals on the circle perimeter (for n firms, the length of the interval is 
1/n). Consumer i has a reservation value “A” and pays two “prices” for purchasing firm j’s 
product (where j denotes the location of the product on the circle): the price of the product, pj,  
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and a total travel cost of  i cz j − , where c is the per unit travel cost and  i z  is consumer i’s 
preferred brand location. A consumer purchases the product that yields the highest utility (i.e. 
purchase j if: ,   ij j i ik UA p c z j U k j =− − −> ∀ ≠). 
Let us focus on two neighboring firms j and j’ located at 0 and 1/n, respectively. 
Considering a consumer at z receiving equal surplus from these two firms, we have the following 
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When all other firms charge p = pj’, the maximization problem facing firm j is  
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= −+ − ⎜⎟
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,  
where W is the raw input price paid to farmers and F is the processor’s fixed cost. The first-order 
condition for firm j is  2/ 0 j pp W c n −+ += . In a symmetric equilibrium,  / j p pW c n == + . In 
addition, with free entry each firm earns zero profits and therefore p Wn F = + . The number of 
firms n can be endogenously determined and the equilibrium number of firms is  / nc F = . 
Hence, the equilibrium price is p Wc F =+ . It is easy to see that processors charge higher 
prices when they incur higher marginal and fixed costs. For a given raw input price, it is also  
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reasonable that the downstream price is higher when consumers have stronger brand preference 
(higher c).
2  
To solve for equilibrium W, we substitute  1/(2 ) M n =  and  1/ R Qn = =  into equation 
(1). In equilibrium, 
1
(2 ) (2 )
22
t
R MW t M W Q
nn n
β






=+ =+ , 
where t and F have a positive impact while β and c act inversely. Note that the second term t/(4n) 
is served to compensate farmers’ transportation costs (t). If farmers incur no transportation costs, 
processors’ payments to farmers are based on the market input supply curve (1/β). 
 
4.  Main Results 
4.1  Price Spreads 
Now we consider the spreads between processed good prices and raw input prices. When 
Bertrand competition is assumed, processors’ profits can be written as a function of the input 
price  W:  () () p RW W RW F π =⋅ − − . Since the processed good market is imperfectly 
competitive, the first order condition for π  is: 
 
( ) () () ()
() ()
p RR W R W R W






where the left-hand side represents the marginal revenue product of using the input and the right-
hand side represents its marginal costs. Note that the second term on the right-hand side is the 
source of buyer market power and it takes this form because each processor is a monopsonist for 
farmers located in its market area of size 2M. If the input market were a perfectly competitive 
                                                 
2 However, when W is endogenously determined, the brand preference may have a positive or negative impact on 
downstream prices. See the welfare analysis below for details.  
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market with many buyers, the term  ( )/ WR W W ∂ ∂  would be equal to zero so that the marginal 
cost of the input that the processor faces is only given by the aggregate supply  ( ) R W . 
The key feature of this model, however, is that the term   ( )/ R WW ∂ ∂  is a function of 
both how much additional input can be acquired as a result of an increased input price, and how 
much the market area M is affected by such an increase. After rearranging terms, the price-cost 
margin (or spread between processors’ and farmers’ prices) can be expressed as: 

























                                 (4) 
It turns out that the price spread has two components: one due to buyer market power in the raw 
input market, 1/η, and one due to seller market power in the processed good market, -P/(WεD). 
The demand elasticity εD is negative in the imperfectly competitive processed good market. As a 
result, the price spread is usually larger than that of the competitive processed good market. In 
Rogers and Sexton (1994), this term is zero due to the assumption of a perfectly competitive 
processed good market. 
The three elasticity terms  ,, , ,, RW RM MW η ηη are positive, and, in general, the higher η , the 
lower the price spread. The key term in this expression is  / M W ∂ ∂ , which in turn is a function 
of how rivals’ would react to changes in the mill price W (i.e.  */ WW ∂ ∂ , where W* is rival’s 
processor mill price). We will first examine the case of Bertrand competition in the analysis.
3  
                                                 
3 The different behavioral assumptions will be considered, including Bertrand ( */ 0 WW ∂ ∂= ), collusion 
( */ 1 WW ∂∂ = ) and Cournot competition ( */ 0 RR ∂ ∂=).  
 
11
One of Sexton and Rogers (1994) findings is that transportation costs matter in how 
price-spreads are determined. For example, under Bertrand competition price-spreads are zero if 
transportation costs are ignored, but positive if they are taken into account. In general, price 
spreads increase as transportation costs increase, suggesting that farmers’ dollar share of the final 
product’s price is likely to be smaller than that of other industries where perishability and 
transportation are not important. In addition, as the number of processors increases, the price-
spread decreases. 
As mentioned previously, a critical assumption in Sexton and Rogers’ approach is that 
the market for the processed good is perfectly competitive and hence its price p is taken as given 
by processors. The price spread is then solely a function of the equilibrium input price W. Thus a 
higher price spread (p-W)/W necessarily translates into a lower input price W, which need not be 
the case if p is endogenously determined by imperfect competition in the processed good market. 
Given farmers’ frequent criticisms of how higher processor concentration has caused farmers to 
receive a smaller dollar share of the final product price, the interesting question that arises is 
what portion of this lower share is due to buyer market power as described by Sexton and 
Rogers, and what portion is due to higher prices of the processed good (p) as a consequence of 
imperfect competition in the downstream market. 


















To derive  , M W η , we apply a similar logic as in equation (2): an indifferent farmer between a 
processor and its adjacent rival receives equal net prices and the distance between the processor 
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where producer conduct α is defined by 
* 1( / ) WW − ∂∂ . For example, 
* /0 WW ∂ ∂=  and α = 1 
in Bertrand competition. Hence, 
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Taking the expression for the price spread in equation (4), if we define  1/ u S η =  and 
/( ) dD Sp W ε =− , then the total price spreads  ud SS S = + , where  u S  is the component of price 
spreads due to buyer market power in the raw input market (upstream) and  d S  is the one due to 
seller market power in the processed good market (downstream). As a result, two components of 
the price spreads can be expressed by 
() () () ()
1( 2 ) 1 6 /
2( ) 4/ 4 4/
u
tM W tM t c F
S
Wt MWt M cF t t cF t
β

















  Since the price spreads come from market power in both upstream and downstream 
markets, they are influenced by the variables in these two markets. In other words, any 
exogenous variable in either upstream or downstream market (c, F, t, or β) has impacts on both  
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spreads. Such a feature has not been fully explored in previous studies. To examine the 



















































We first discuss the impact of processor’s fixed costs (F) on the price spreads. An 
increase in fixed costs, (e.g.,  R&D expense, capacity expansion, increased safety regulation), 
which results in a decrease in the number of firms, it is reasonable to see both components of the 
price spreads increase because of the resulting increase in market power of processors in both the 
buying and selling side of the market. A large coefficient of farmer’s supply function (β) implies 
inputs supplied by farmers are more sensitive to the price received (W). For a given quantity 
supplied, farmers receive lower prices with a larger β, resulting in larger upstream and 
downstream spreads. 
While the effects of farmer’s transportation costs (t) and consumer’s brand preference (c) 
are more complicated, they are generally unambiguous. When farmers incur more transportation 
costs (i.e., t increases), processors can exercise more buyer market power and the upstream 
component of the price spread ( u S ) increases. In addition, the impact of t on the downstream 
component of the price spread ( d S ) is by way of raw input prices (W). Increasing transportation 
costs should push up input prices and, in turn, result in smaller downstream price spreads. When 
consumers have stronger brand preference, they are willing to pay more for a preferred product 
and their brand selections are relatively restricted. The processors can enjoy more seller market 
power and the downstream component of the price spread ( d S ) is larger. However, stronger 
                                                 
4 The results of Su are based on an assumption that  (4 ) /(4 ) nt β αα >− . If Bertrand competition, α = 1, is 
assumed,  3/ 4 nt β > . See the appendix for more details. The inequalities might be reversed as α decreases; for 
example, α = 0 in a collusion case.  
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brand preference results in a smaller upstream component of the price spread ( u S ) because the 
equilibrium number of firms increases and processors’ buyer market power gets smaller. 
4.2  Welfare 
In this section, we illustrate the welfare of farmers and consumers while all processors 
receive zero profits due to free entry. We first look at farmers’ surplus. 
4.2.1  Farmers’ Surplus 
Since farmers’ production costs are assumed to be 0 in the current model, farmer i at 





















=−≥− =+ − =− ≥ .
5 (7) 
An individual farmer is worse off as the processing industry is more concentrated (small n). 








nn n n β β
⎛⎞
−= − = + − = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫ . 
Though the surplus of all farmers serving a specific processor is inversely affected by the 
number of processors, the total surplus of all farmers serving n processors is 1/ β ; i.e., the total 
surplus is independent of the industry concentration. For a flatter input supply curve (larger β), 
farmers receive smaller total surplus. They may have no surplus when facing an infinite elasticity 
of supply (horizontal input supply curve). 
The other interesting feature is that the farmers’ total surplus has nothing to do with 
farmers’ transportation costs (t). This is because a change in farmers’ total surplus due to t is 
                                                 
5 Note that the circle of the upstream market can be larger than that of the downstream market (the downstream 
circumference size equals 1).  According to equation (7), farmers located from a processor further than 1/M do not 
supply raw inputs because positive profits are not feasible to them. As a result, the upstream suppliers (farmers) to 
different processors are not connected in this case.  
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completely offset by a change caused by raw input prices (W). To see this, we differentiate  fi π  











The effects of an increase in t include an increase of raw input prices ( 1/(4n) ) and an additional 
transportation cost (di). When t increases, a farmer located close to a processor (0 1/(4 ) i dn ≤< ) 
has a welfare gain while one far away from a processor (1/(4 ) 1/(2 ) i nd n < ≤ ) has a loss. 
However, if we take all farmers serving a specific processor into consideration, the total effects 










⎛⎞ −= −= ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫ , for all processors. 
The above expression explains why the farmers’ transportation costs do not appear in farmers’ 
surplus. 
4.2.2  Consumer Surplus 
  We turn to consumer surplus in this section. Consumer surplus can be derived by 
()
1/(2 ) 1/(2 )
00 2( ) d 2( ) d
15 11
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Through equilibrium price charged by processors (p), raw input price received by farmers (W), 
and number of processors (n), consumers receive less welfare with larger fixed costs (larger F) 
for the processors, larger transportation costs (larger t) for the farmers, and steeper farmer’s 
supply curve (smaller β). For the impact of consumer’s brand preference (c), there are two 
effects: stronger brand preference has 1) a direct effect that consumers have to pay more “travel 
costs” and 2) an indirect effect that stronger preference may encourage more firms (brands) to 
join the market and provide more varieties (larger n). From equilibrium p, W, and n, we can see 
how brand preference (c) affects p and W through n and ultimately through t. Let us examine the 
impact of brand preference on prices first: 





Wc t c t
cc n c c c c β
⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ =+ =+ + = − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
That is, the equilibrium price charged by processors are decreasing in brand preference if 
farmers’ transportation costs are sufficiently large (t > 4c). This reduction in prices of processed 
product is related to the decreasing input prices (W) through large enough farmers’ transportation 
costs (t), which dominate the effect of stronger preference causing higher prices. Together with 
travel costs, the second component of the total prices facing consumers, the farmers’ 
transportation costs (t) have to be even larger such that consumers have welfare gains due to their 
strong brand preference. The result can be seen in the following equation: 
  ()
1











The impact of brand preference on consumer surplus depends on relative magnitudes of brand 
preference to farmer’s transportation costs. For a relative small brand preference (c < t/5), as a 
result, consumer surplus increases but price decreases in brand preference. On the other hand, for 
a relative large brand preference (c > t/4), consumer surplus decreases but price increases in 
brand preference. For a median case (t/5 < c < t/4), both consumer surplus and price decrease in 
brand preference. The result of the median case is because the reduction in price is not sufficient 
to cover the increase in the travel costs, which results in consumers’ welfare loss. 
4.3  Discussions of Price Spreads and Farmers’ Surplus 
  In the previous sections we have discussed the characteristics and comparative statics of 
price spreads and welfare. It is interesting to compare price spreads and farmers’ surplus as the 
welfare effects may not be necessarily implied by the price spreads. 
  Though the decreasing dollar share of the final product that farmers receive is a major 
concern in a more concentrated industry, our response to this concern is that we have to identify 
the source of the concentration first. The examination of the price spreads indicates that while the 
higher processor concentration due to increasing fixed costs may cause farmers to receive a 
smaller dollar share of the final product price, the impact of decreasing consumer brand 
preference is mixed. That is, if the increasing industry concentration is due to lower consumer 
brand preference, the total price spreads may or may not increase and the net effect depends on 
the relative magnitude of  / u Sc ∂∂  and  / d Sc ∂ ∂ . 
In general, farmers receive higher mill prices when there are fewer processors in the 
market. However, some of the farmers have to travel longer distances to deliver the inputs after 
the exit of some processors. While the surplus of all farmers serving a processor is increasing in 
the industry concentration, the total surplus of all farmers serving all processors is independent  
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of the industry concentration. Therefore, while more concentration redistributes welfare among 
farmers, total farmer surplus remains unchanged. 
Our model conforms with the commonly observed fact that industry concentration is 
directly related to price spreads and inversely related to farmers’ dollar share of the final product 
price. However, we also find that the mill input prices increase with concentration. This means 
that farmers close to an operating processor have welfare gains when concentration increases, but 
there are other farmers that face a significant welfare loss as there are fewer (and more distant) 
processors to sell to. Our analysis suggests that while it is important to address the concern about 
the increasing price spreads with the concentration trend, it is more straightforward to look at the 
welfare implication. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Motivated by the consolidation trend of food processing industries in past decades, in this 
paper we present a simple model to study the farmer-processor relationship that characterizes a 
key feature in these industries: the processors exercise increasing market power in both raw input 
markets as buyers and processed good markets as sellers. We develop a model that allows for 
homogeneous inputs with high transportation costs in the upstream market and differentiated 
processed products to final consumers in the downstream market. For a purpose of computational 
tractability, we make some assumptions to simplify the model: farmers are uniformly distributed 
on a circle of circumference and incur only transportation casts; processors have a fixed-
proportion technology, interact with their competitors in a Bertrand-Nash fashion, and are free to 
enter the market.  Though the model is simple, it performs reasonably well and captures several 
feature observations in food processing industries.  
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Given farmers’ frequent criticisms of how higher processor concentration has caused 
farmers to receive a smaller dollar share of the final product price, we successfully decompose 
the spread between prices that both farmers and processors receive into two components: one due 
to buyer market power in the agricultural input market and one due to seller market power in the 
differentiated processed market.  We show that farmers receive a decreasing dollar share of the 
final price in a more concentrated processed good market. The price spread due to processors’ 
buyer (seller) market power decreases (increases) with smaller farmers’ transportation costs and 
with stronger consumers’ brand preference. We also complement our study with welfare effects 
as the welfare may not be necessarily implied by the price spreads. The welfare comparisons 
indicate that the total surplus of farmers serving all processors is independent of the industry 
concentration. The farmers’ total surplus is also independent of their transportation costs because 
all changes in farmers’ transportation costs are offset by the input prices. Consumers are worse 
off when the processed good market is more concentrated and farmers’ transportation costs are 
larger. Consumers’ brand preference has two effects: while stronger brand preference implies 
more “travel costs” for consumers, it may encourage more firms to join the market and provide 
more varieties, which results in welfare gains. When the brand preference is relative small, 
consumer surplus may increase in brand preference. 
  Moreover, processors receive zero profits because of the free entry assumption in our 
study. Though not captured by the model, potential entrants are allowed to enter the markets 
under this free entry assumption and it may take longer time for the transition of market structure 
as fixed costs can be a major portion of total costs in the food industries and the entry decision 
may be significantly delayed. As such, the incumbents may enjoy positive profits during the 
adjustment process.  
 
20
For the future plan of this study, we will first consider other behavioral assumptions, 
including collusion and Cournot competition as mentioned in footnote 4. Collusion has  , 0 MW η =  
and hence yields the highest markup by making 1/η  as small as possible. For Cournot and 
Bertrand competition,  , 0 MW η ≠  and  , M W η   is larger for Bertrand competition. Therefore, the 
Cournot price spread is higher than the Bertrand price spread, but lower than the collusive 
spread. In addition, we may assume that consumers differ in their maximum willingness to pay 
for the product (“A” or reservation price) and their strength of brand preference (“c” or 
transportation cost). Following Borenstein (1985), consumers’ preferences are bivariate normally 
distributed on the two-dimensional (A, c) space. In this extended model consumers who have a 
sufficiently large brand preference with respect to their reservation price are served 
“monopolistically” whereas consumers who have a relatively small brand preference (such that 
more than one product yields positive utility) are served “competitively”. It would be interesting 




This appendix derives some comparative statics of price spreads. In equations (5) and (6) 
we have expressions for the price spread due to buyer market power in the raw input market ( u S ) 
and the one due to seller market power in the processed good market ( d S ). By taking derivatives 
on  u S  and  d S   with respect to consumer’s brand preference (c), processor’s fixed costs (F), 
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If we assume that  (4 ) /(4 ) nt β αα >− , it is easy to show that 
22 16 (4 ) 0 cF t αα β −− >  by 
using equilibrium  / nc F = . When Bertrand competition is assumed,  1 α =  and  3/ 4 nt β > . 
To see why this inequality is valid, we borrow some numbers from Durham and Sexton 
(1992). In Durham and Sexton’s (1992) study on California’s processing tomato market, total 
farm-to-processor shipping costs, td, are in the range of 25% of raw product value. That is, the 
maximal  t* is such that t*M=W/4. As a result, 












=+ , where x is a ratio and 










and it is easy to verify that 
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. In other words, under the Bertrand 
competition assumption and the observation that total farm-to-processor shipping costs are in the 
range of 25% of raw product value,  3/ 4 nt β >   for any number of processors in the 


























On the other hand, because  (4 ) /(4 ) t β αα −   is decreasing in α, the inequality might be 
reversed as α decreases; for example, α = 0 in a collusion case. We focus only on the Bertrand 
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